Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially observed stochastic dynamic games is known to be quite challenging, with the difficulties stemming from the noisy nature of the measurements available to individual players (agents) and the decentralized nature of this information. When the number of players is sufficiently large and the interactions among agents is of the mean-field type, one way to overcome this challenge is to investigate the infinite-population limit of the problem, which leads to a mean-field game. In this paper, we consider discrete-time partially observed mean-field games with infinite-horizon discounted cost criteria. Using the technique of converting the original partially observed stochastic control problem to a fully observed one on the belief space and the dynamic programming principle, we establish the existence of Nash equilibria for these game models under very mild technical conditions. Then, we show that the mean-field equilibrium policy, when adopted by each agent, forms an approximate Nash equilibrium for games with sufficiently many agents.
Introduction
In this paper, we consider discrete-time mean-field games with decentralized partial observation under infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criteria. This type of game models arise as the infinite population limit of finite-agent dynamic games of the mean-field type; that is, the interactions among agents are modeled by the mean-field term (i.e., the empirical distribution of their states), which affects both the agents' individual costs, and their state and observation transition probabilities. Letting the number of agents go to infinity, the mean-field term converges to the distribution of a single generic agent. Hence, in the limiting case, a generic agent is faced with a single-agent stochastic control problem with a constraint on the distribution of the state at each time (i.e., mean-field game problem). The main goal in this class of problems is to establish the existence of a policy and a state distribution flow such that when the generic agent applies this policy, the resulting distribution of agent's state is same as the state distribution flow. This last property is called the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) principle (Huang et al. [24] ). The purpose of this paper is to study the existence of such an equilibrium for a general class of mean-field game models with discounted-cost criteria under decentralized partial observation and to establish that the policy in the mean-field equilibrium constitutes a nearly Nash equilibrium for finite-agent games with sufficiently many agents.
Mean-field games have been introduced by Huang et al. [24] and Lasry and P.Lions [27] around the same time to establish the existence of approximate Nash equilibria for fully-observed noncooperative differential games with a large number of identical agents. The main feature of this approach is to reduce the decentralized game problem to a centralized stochastic decision problem 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS using the NCE principle. The equilibrium solution of this decision problem provides an almost Nash equilibrium when the number of agents is sufficiently large. Characterization of the solution entails a Fokker-Planck equation evolving forward in time and a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation evolving backward in time. We refer the reader to Huang et al. [23] , Tembine et al. [34] , Huang [21] , Bensoussan et al. [2] , Cardaliaguet [8] , Carmona and Delarue [9] , Gomes and Saúde [16] , J.Moon and Başar [25] for studies of fully-observed continuous-time mean-field games with different models and cost functions, such as games with major-minor players, risk-sensitive games, games with Markov jump parameters, and LQG games.
In the literature relatively few results are available on partially-observed mean-field games. Indeed, our work appears to be the first one that studies discrete-time mean-field games under partial observations. Existing works have mostly studied the continuous-time setup, and analyses of continuous-time and discrete-time setups are quite different. Huang et al. [22] study a partiallyobserved continuous-time mean-field game with linear individual dynamics. Şen and Caines [10, 11] consider a continuous-time mean-field game with major-minor agents and nonlinear dynamics where the minor agents can partially observe the state of the major agent. Şen and Caines [13, 12] also develop a nonlinear filtering theory for McKean-Vlasov type stochastic differential equations that arise as the infinite population limit of the partially-observed differential game of the meanfield type. The nonlinear filtering equation is derived using Itô's lemma for Banach space valued stochastic processes. Tang and Meng [33] study a continuous-time partially observed stochastic control problem of the mean-field type and establish a maximum principle to characterize the optimal control. Huang and Wang [20] consider a continuous-time mean-field game with linear individual dynamics where two types of partial information structure are considered: (i) agents cannot observe the white-noise which is common to all agents, (ii) agents can access the additive white-noise version of their own states.
The class of discrete-time mean-field games we consider in this paper are defined on a Polish state space and with infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criteria for the players, who have access to decentralized partial observation on their individual states. In such games, a generic agent is faced with a partially observed stochastic control problem under the NCE principle, which, as indicated earlier, states that the state distribution flow under an optimal decision rule should be the same as the mean-field term that appears in the state and observation dynamics as well as in the individual cost functions. In accordance with this, the classical techniques used to study partially observed optimal control problems are not sufficient to analyze mean-field games. To establish the existence of an equilibrium solution, we have to bring in the fixed-point approach that is used to obtain equilibria in classical game problems, along with the technique of converting partially observed optimal control problems to fully observed ones on the belief space and then employing the dynamic programming principle. The precise descriptions of the mean-field game and the finite-agent game problems are given in Sections 2 and 3, respectively. In Section 4 we prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium. In Section 5 we establish that the mean-field equilibrium policy is approximately Nash for finite-agent games with sufficiently many agents. In Section 6 we illustrate our results by considering an example.
In Saldi et al. [30] (see also the abridged conference version [31] ) we solved the fully-observed version of this problem under a similar set of assumptions on the system components. The techniques used in this paper to establish the existence of a mean field and an approximate Nash equilibrium are almost the same as in Saldi et al. [30] modulo some transformations of the original problems into equivalent ones for which we can still use the techniques in Saldi et al. [30] . However, as a result of these transformations, there are highly non-trivial differences between the proofs in this paper and in Saldi et al. [30] . For instance, as a result of fully observed reduction of partially observed optimal control problem in the mean field game, the dependence of the state transition probability of the fully observed model on the mean-field term is not explicit as in Saldi et al. [30] . Therefore, it is quite challenging to prove the weak continuity of this transition probability with respect to the mean-field term, which is a very crucial result in order to establish the existence of a mean-field equilibrium.
Notation. For a metric space E, we let C b (E) denote the set of all bounded continuous real functions on E, and P(E) denote the set of all Borel probability measures on E. For any E-valued random element x, L(x)( · ) ∈ P(E) denotes the distribution of x. A sequence {µ n } of measures on E is said to converge weakly to a measure µ if E g(e)µ n (de) → E g(e)µ(de) for all g ∈ C b (E). For any ν ∈ P(E) and measurable real function g on E, we define ν(g) := gdν. For any subset B of E, we let ∂B and B c denote the boundary and complement of B, respectively. The notation v ∼ ν means that the random element v has distribution ν. Unless otherwise specified, the term "measurable" will refer to Borel measurability.
Partially observed mean-field games and mean-field equilibria
We consider a discrete-time partially observed mean-field game subject to infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. This mean-field game model is specified by
where X, Y, and A are the Polish state, observation, and action spaces, respectively. The stochastic kernel p : X × A × P(X) → P(X) denotes the transition probability law of the next state given the previous state-action pair and state-measure flow, and the stochastic kernel r : X × P(X) → P(Y) denotes the transition probability law of the current observation given the current state and statemeasure flow. The measurable function c : X × A × P(X) → [0, ∞) is the one-stage cost function and µ 0 is the distribution of the initial state.
Define the history spaces G 0 = Y and G t = (Y × A) t × Y for t = 1, 2, . . ., all endowed with product Borel σ-algebras. A policy is a sequence π = {π t } of stochastic kernels on A given G t . The set of all policies is denoted by Π. Partially observed mean-field games are not games in the classical sense. They are indeed single-agent partially observed stochastic control problems whose state distribution at each time step should satisfy some consistency condition. In other words, we have a single agent with partial observations and model the overall behavior of (a large population of) other agents by an exogenous state-measure flow µ := (µ t ) t≥0 ⊂ P(X) with a given initial condition µ 0 . This measure flow µ should also be consistent with the state distributions of this single agent when the agent acts optimally. The precise mathematical description of the problem is given as follows.
We let M := µ ∈ P(X) ∞ : µ 0 is fixed be the set of all state-measure flows with a given initial condition µ 0 . Given any measure flow µ ∈ M, the probabilistic evolution of the states, observations, and actions is as follows
where g(t) ∈ G t is the observation-action history up to time t. According to the Ionescu Tulcea theorem (see, e.g., Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre [18] ), an initial distribution µ 0 on X, a policy π, and a state-measure flow µ define a unique probability measure P π on (X × Y × A) ∞ . The expectation with respect to P π is denoted by E π . A policy π * ∈ Π is said to be optimal for µ if
00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS where the infinite-horizon discounted cost of policy π with measure flow µ and the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) is given by
Using these definitions, we first define the set-valued mapping
as Ψ(µ) = {π ∈ Π : π is optimal for µ}. Conversely, we define a single-valued mapping
as follows: given π ∈ Π, the state-measure flow µ := Λ(π) is constructed recursively as
where P π (da(t)|x(t)) denotes the conditional distribution of a(t) given x(t) under π and (µ τ ) 0≤τ ≤t . Using Ψ and Λ, we now introduce the notion of an equilibrium for the mean-field game.
Definition 2.1. A pair (π, µ) ∈ Π × M is a mean-field equilibrium if π ∈ Ψ(µ) and µ = Λ(π). In other words, the policy π is optimal for the state-measure flow µ and µ is consistent with the state distributions of the agent when it acts optimally via π.
In this section, the main goal is to establish the existence of a mean-field equilibrium. To that end, we impose the assumptions below on the components of the mean-field game model. 
(c) The observation kernel r is continuous in (x, µ) with respect to total variation norm; i.e., for all x and µ, r( · |x k , µ k ) → r( · |x, µ) in total variation norm when (x k , µ k ) → (x, µ).
(d) A is compact and X is locally compact. (e) There exist a constant α ≥ 0 and a continuous moment function w : X → [0, ∞) (see Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre [18, Definition E.7] ) such that
The main result of this section is the existence of a mean-field equilibrium under Assumption 2.1. Later we will show that this mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash-equilibrium for games with sufficiently many agents.
Theorem 2.1. Under Assumption 1, the mean-field game X, A, Y, p, r, c, µ 0 admits a meanfield equilibrium (π, µ).
The proof of Theorem 2.1 is given Section 4. To establish the existence of an equilibrium, we use fully observed reduction of partially observed optimal control problems and the dynamic programming principle in addition to the fixed point approach that is commonly used in classical game problems.
Finite Player Game
The motivation for studying mean-field game problems is coming from the challenges to establish the existence of Nash equilibria for finite population stochastic dynamic games with mean-field interactions. More precisely, suppose that we have a discrete-time partially observed N -agent stochastic game with state space X, action space A, and observation space Y. For every t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} and every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, let x N i (t) ∈ X, a N i (t) ∈ A, and y N i (t) ∈ Y denote the state, the action, and the observation of Agent i at time t, and let
denote the empirical distribution of the states of agents at time t, where δ x ∈ P(X) is the Dirac measure at x. The initial states x N i (0) are independent and identically distributed according to µ 0 . For each t ≥ 0, the current-observations (y 
Define the history spaces
. ., all endowed with product Borel σ-algebras. A policy for a generic agent is a sequence π = {π t } of stochastic kernels on A given H t . The set of all policies for Agent i is denoted by Π i . LetΠ i be the set of policies in Π i which only use the observations; that is, π ∈Π i if π t :
denote the N -tuple of policies for all the agents in the game. Under such N -tuple of policies, the actions of agents at each time t ≥ 0 is obtained randomly according to the conditional probability law 1) where
) is the observation-action history observed by Agent i up to time t. Note that agents can only use their local observations. Hence, it is a partially observed game model.
For Agent i, the infinite-horizon discounted cost under the initial distribution µ 0 and N -tuple of policies
where E π (N) · denotes expectation with respect to the unique probability law induced by the above stochastic update rules and the initial state distribution µ 0 on the infinite product of state, observation, and action spaces of all agents.
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Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for the class of games formulated above is known to be difficult due to (almost) decentralized and noisy nature of the information structure of the problem. Indeed, even if the number of players is small, it is all but impossible to show even the existence of approximate Nash equilibria for these type of games. However, when the number of players is sufficiently large, one way to overcome this challenge is to introduce the infinitepopulation limit N → ∞ of the game described here. In this limiting case, we can model the empirical distributions of the state configurations as an exogenous state-measure flow, which should be consistent with the distribution of a generic agent (i.e., the NCE principle) by the law of large numbers. Hence, in the limiting case, a generic agent is faced with precisely a mean-field game that was introduced in the preceding section. Then one would expect that if each agent in the finite-agent N game problem adopts the mean-field equilibrium policy, the resulting policy will be an approximate Nash equilibrium for all sufficiently large N . Therefore, by studying the infinitepopulation limit, which is easier to handle, one can obtain approximate Nash equilibrium for the original finite-agent game problem for which establishing the existence of a true Nash equilibrium is very difficult.
To that end, we slightly change the definition of Nash equilibrium in this model and adopt the following solution concept:
for each i = 1, . . . , N , and an ε-Nash equilibrium (for a given ε > 0) if
Note that in this new definition, agents can only use their local observations (y N i (t), . . . , y N i (0)) to design their policies. In Section 5, we will show that the policy π in the mean-field equilibrium (π, µ) is an ε-Nash equilibrium (for a given ε > 0) when the number of agents is sufficiently large.
Proof of Theorem 2.1
Note that, given any measure flow µ ∈ M, the optimal control problem for the mean-field game reduces to one of finding an optimal policy for a partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP). Hence, before starting the proof of Theorem 2.1, we first review a few relevant results on POMDPs. To this end, fix any µ ∈ M and consider the corresponding optimal control problem.
Let P w (X) := µ ∈ P(X) : µ(w) < ∞ . It is known that any POMDP can be reduced to a (completely observable) MDP (see Yushkevich [35] , Rhenius [29] ), whose states are the posterior state distributions or beliefs of the observer; that is, the state at time t is z(t) := Pr{x(t) ∈ · |y(0), . . . , y(t), a(0), . . . , a(t − 1)} ∈ P(X).
We call this equivalent MDP the belief-state MDP. Note that since L(x(t)) ∈ P w (X) under any policy by Assumption 1-(e),(f), we have Pr{x(t) ∈ · |y(0), . . . , y(t), a(0), . . . , a(t− 1)} ∈ P w (X) almost everywhere. Therefore, the belief-state MDP has state space Z = P w (X) and action space A, where Z is equipped with the Borel σ-algebra generated by the topology of weak convergence. The transition probabilities {η t } t≥0 of the belief-state MDP can be constructed as follows (see also Hernández-Lerma [17] ). Let z denote the generic state variable for the belief-state MDP. Fix any t ≥ 0. First consider the transition probability on
Then, we define the mapping
Note that
Then, η t : Z × A → P(Z) can be written as
The initial point for the belief-state MDP is µ 0 ; that is, L(z(0)) ∼ δ µ 0 . Finally, for each t ≥ 0, the one-stage cost function C t of the belief-state MDP is given by
Hence, the belief-state MDP is a Markov decision process with the components
For the belief-state MDP define the history spaces K 0 = Z and K t = (Z × A) t × Z, t = 1, 2, . . .. A policy is a sequence ϕ = {ϕ t } of stochastic kernels on A given K t . The set of all policies is denoted by Φ. A Markov policy is a sequence ϕ = {ϕ t } of stochastic kernels on A given Z. The set of Markov policies is denoted by M. LetJ (ϕ, µ 0 ) denote the discounted cost function of policy ϕ ∈ Φ for initial point µ 0 of the belief-state MDP. Notice that any history vector s(t) = (z(0), . . . , z(t), a(0), . . . , a(t − 1)) of the belief-state MDP is a function of the history vector g(t) = (y(0), . . . , y(t), a(0), . . . , a(t− 1)) of the POMDP. Let us write this relation as i(g(t)) = s(t). Hence, for a policy ϕ = {ϕ t } ∈ Φ, we can define a policy π ϕ = {π
Let us write this as a mapping from Φ to Π:
It is straightforward to show that the cost functionsJ(ϕ, µ 0 ) and J (π ϕ , µ 0 ) are the same. One can also prove that (see Yushkevich [35] , Rhenius [29] )
and furthermore, that if ϕ is an optimal policy for belief-state MDP, then π ϕ is optimal for the POMDP as well. Therefore, the optimal control problem for the mean-field game is equivalent to the optimal control of belief-state MDP. Now, we derive the conditions satisfied by the components of the belief-state MDP under Assumption 1. Note first that Z = n≥1 K n where K n := {µ ∈ P w (X) : µ(w) ≤ n}. Since w is a moment function, each K n is tight (Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre [18, Proposition E.8]). Moreover, each 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS K n is also closed since w is continuous. Therefore, each K n is compact with respect to the weak topology. This implies that Z is a locally compact Polish space. Define W : Z → R as
Note that W is a moment function on Z. Indeed, we have
We also have
Moreover, by Feinberg et al. [15, Theorem 3.6 ], η t is weakly continuous in (z, a) for all t ≥ 0. Therefore, the belief-state MDP satisfies the following conditions under Assumption 1.
(i) The cost functions {C t } are bounded and continuous.
(ii) The stochastic kernels {η t } are weakly continuous.
(iii) A is compact and Z is locally compact.
(iv) There exist a constant α ≥ 0 and a lower semi-continuous moment function W :
(v) The initial probability measure δ µ 0 satisfies
Our approach to prove Theorem 2.1 can be summarized as follows: (i) first, we lift the partially observed stochastic control problem, that a generic agent is faced with, to a fully observed stochastic control problem (i.e., belief-state MDP) using the above mentioned results; (ii) we prove that the state transition probabilities of the belief-state MDP are continuous with respect to state measure flow of the original partially observed problem, (iii) finally, we use the technique in our paper Saldi et al. [30] , which is developed to show the existence of mean-field equilibria for fully observed mean-field games, to finish the proof. The key step in our approach is (ii) in which we mimic the elegant proof technique that is established by Feinberg et al. [15] to prove the weak continuity of the transition probabilities of fully observed reduction of partially observed stochastic control problems.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.1. Define the mapping B : P(Z) → P(X) as follows:
In other words, B(ν) is the so-called 'barycenter' of ν, see, e.g., Phelps [28] . Using this definition, for any ν ∈ P(Z × A) ∞ , we define the measure flow µ ν ∈ P(X) ∞ as follows:
where for any ν ∈ P(Z × A), we let ν 1 denote the marginal of ν on Z; that is, ν 1 ( · ) := ν( · × A). Let {η ν t } t≥0 and {C ν t } t≥0 be, respectively, the transition probabilities and one-stage cost functions of belief-state MDP induced by the measure flow µ ν . We let J ν * ,t : Z → [0, ∞) denote the discounted cost value function at time t of this belief-state MDP; that is,
. To prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium, we use the technique in our previous paper Saldi et al. [30] adopted from Jovanovic and Rosenthal [26] , which enables us to transform the fixed point equation π ∈ Ψ(Λ(π)) characterizing the mean-field equilibrium into a fixed point equation of a set-valued mapping from the set of state-action measure flows P(Z × A) ∞ into itself. Then, using Kakutani's fixed point theorem (Aliprantis and Border [1, Corollary 17 .55]), we deduce the existence of a mean-field equilibrium.
Remark 4.1. We note that the technique used here to prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium is very similar to the one in our previous paper Saldi et al. [30] , in which we have studied fully-observed version of the same problem. However, there is a crucial difference in the details between this problem and the fully-observed one. In the fully-observed case, the transition probability is given by p( · |x, a, µ t ) from which we can immediately deduce the continuity of the transition probability with respect to state-measure flow. However, in the partially-observed case, we do not have such an explicit analytical expression describing the relation between η ν t and µ ν from which we can deduce the same continuity result. Hence, we need to prove this highly nontrivial statement (unlike the fully-observed case) in order to use the technique in Saldi et al. [30] . Indeed, this is the key step here (step (ii) above) to prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium. After we prove this result, the rest of the proof follows the same steps as in Saldi et al. [30] . However, for the sake of completeness, we give the full details of the proof, since we are using quite different notation as a result of fully-observed reduction of the original problem and the dependence of the transition probability of the belief-state MDP on the state-measure flow is not explicit as in the fully-observed case.
As we mentioned above, we first transform the fixed point equation π ∈ Ψ(Λ(π)) into a fixed point equation of a set-valued mapping from P(Z × A) ∞ into itself. To that end, we define the product space C :
Moreover, we equip C with the following metric:
where σ > 0 is chosen so that σβ < 1. For any t ≥ 0, we define the Bellman optimality operator
In the MDP theory, T ν t gives the relation between value functions J ν * ,t and J ν * ,t+1 . Moreover, given J ν * ,t+1 , it characterizes the optimal policy at time t. It is standard to prove that T ν t is a contraction on C β (Z) with modulus β for all t ≥ 0, i.e., T
It can be shown that T ν is a contraction on C with modulus σβ:
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The following theorem is a known result in the theory of nonhomogeneous Markov decision processes (see Hinderer [19 
where ν ϕ t = L z(t), a(t) under ϕ and ν. We are now ready to define the above-mentioned set-valued map from P(Z × A) ∞ into itself. To that end, for any ν ∈ P(Z × A) ∞ , let us define the following sets:
and
The set-valued mapping Γ :
∞ is given as follows:
We say that ν is a fixed point of Γ if ν ∈ Γ(ν). The following proposition makes the connection between mean-field equilibria and the fixed points of Γ, and so, transforms the fixed point equation π ∈ Ψ(Λ(π)) into the fixed point equation ν ∈ Γ(ν).
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that Γ has a fixed point ν = (ν t ) t≥0 . Construct a Markov policy ϕ = (ϕ t ) t≥0 for belief-state MDP by disintegrating each ν t as ν t (dx, da) = ν t,1 (dx)ϕ t (da|x), and let µ = (B(ν t,1 )) t≥0 . Then the pair (π ϕ , µ) is a mean-field equilibrium.
Proof. Note that, since ν ∈ C(ν), we have ν t = L z(t), a(t) (t ≥ 0) for belief-state MDP under the policy ϕ and the measure flow µ. Then, for any f ∈ C b (X), we have
Since (4.6) is true for all f ∈ C b (X), we have
where P π ϕ (da(t)|x(t)) denotes the conditional distribution of a(t) given x(t) under π ϕ and (µ τ ) 0≤τ ≤t . Hence, Λ(π ϕ ) = µ. Since ν ∈ B(ν), the corresponding Markov policy ϕ satisfies (4.5) for ν. Therefore, by Theorem 4.1 and the fact that ν t = L z(t), a(t) (t ≥ 0) for belief-state MDP under the policy ϕ and the measure flow µ, ϕ is optimal for belief-state MDP induced by the measure flow µ (or, equivalently, ν). Therefore, π ϕ ∈ Ψ(µ). By Proposition 4.1, it suffices to prove that Γ has a fixed point in order to establish the existence of a mean-field equilibrium. To prove this, Kakutani's fixed point theorem (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border [1, Corollary 17.55]), which is a standard result to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium in classical game problems, is the right tool to use. In order to use Kakutani's fixed point theorem, the space on which the set-valued mapping is defined should be convex and compact. However, the set P(Z × A)
∞ in the definition of Γ is not compact. But, we will prove that the image of P(Z × A)
∞ under Γ is contained in a convex and compact subset of P(Z × A) ∞ . Hence, it is sufficient to consider this convex and compact set in the definition of Γ. To that end, for each t ≥ 0, define the set
Since W is a lower semi-continuous moment function, the set P t (Z) is compact with respect to the weak topology, see Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre [18, Proposition E.8, p. 187]. Let us define
Since A is compact, P t (Z × A) is tight. Furthermore, P t (Z × A) is closed with respect to the weak topology. Hence,
, which is convex and compact with respect to the product topology.
Proof. Fix any ν ∈ P(Z × A) ∞ . It is sufficient to prove that C(ν) ⊂ Ξ. Let ν ′ ∈ C(ν). We prove by induction that ν ′ t,1 ∈ P t v (Z) for all t ≥ 0. The claim trivially holds for t = 0 as ν ′ 0,1 = δ µ 0 . Assume the claim holds for t and consider t + 1. We have
. By Proposition 4.2, it is sufficient to prove that Γ has a fixed point ν ∈ Ξ. As in Jovanovic and Rosenthal [26, Theorem 1], one can prove that C(ν) ∩ B(ν) = ∅ for any ν ∈ Ξ. Moreover, note that both C(ν) and B(ν) are convex, and thus their intersection is also convex. Ξ is a convex compact subset of a locally convex topological space M(Z × A) ∞ , where M(Z × A) denotes the set of all finite signed measures on Z × A. Hence, in order to deduce the existence of a fixed point of Γ, we need to prove that it has a closed graph. Before stating this result, we prove the following proposition which is a key element of the proof as mentioned earlier (i.e., step (ii)). Its proof is given in Appendix A. 
Proof. We note that modulo Proposition 4.3, the proof of the proposition is almost the same as the proof in Saldi et al. [30, Proposition 3.9] for the full state measurement case. However, for the sake of completeness, we give the proof here.
Let
To prove Gr(Γ) is closed, it is sufficient to prove that ξ ∈ Γ(ν).
Using Proposition 4.3, we first prove that ξ ∈ C(ν); that is, for all t ≥ 0, we have
For all n and t, we have [32, p. 388] ). This implies that the measure in the right hand side of (4.7) converges weakly to Z×A η ν t ( · |z, a)ν t (dz, da). Therefore, we have
from which we conclude that ξ ∈ C(ν).
To complete the proof, it suffices to prove that ξ ∈ B(ν). To that end, for each n and t, let us define the following functions
By definition,
1 Suppose g, gn (n ≥ 1) are measurable functions on metric space E. The sequence gn is said to converge to g continuously if limn→∞ gn(en) = g(e) for any en → e where e ∈ E.
Define also the following sets
, for all n and t.
To prove to ξ ∈ B(ν), we need to show that 1 = ξ t A t , for all t.
First note that since both F 
This implies that
For any fixed M , we prove that the limit of the second term in the last expression converges to zero. To that end, we first note that ξ Therefore, we obtain
where the last inequality follows from the Portmanteau theorem (see, e.g., Billingsley [5, Theorem 2.1]) and the fact that A t is closed. Hence, ξ t (A t ) = 1. Since t is arbitrary, this is true for all t. This means that ξ ∈ B(ν). Therefore, ξ ∈ Γ(ν).
Recall that Ξ is a compact convex subset of the locally convex topological space M(Z × A) ∞ . Furthermore, the graph of Γ is closed by Proposition 4.4, and it takes nonempty convex values. Therefore, by Kakutani's fixed point theorem (Aliprantis and Border [1, Corollary 17.55]), Γ has a fixed point. Therefore, the pair (π ϕ , µ) is a mean field equilibrium, where π ϕ and µ are constructed as in the statement of Proposition 4.1. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.1.
Approximation of Nash Equilibria
In this section, our aim is to show that the policy generated by the mean-field equilibrium, when adopted by each agent, is nearly Nash equilibrium for games with sufficiently large number of agents. Let (π ′ , µ) denote the pair in the mean-field equilibrium. In addition to Assumption 2.1, we impose an additional assumption, which is stated below. To this end, let d BL denote the bounded Lipschitz metric (see, e.g., Dudley [14, Proposition 11.3.2]) on P(X) that metrizes the weak topology, and define the following moduli of continuity:
and weakly continuous. (c) The observation kernel r( · |x) does not depend on the mean-field term.
For t ≥ 0, let
. . , y(0)) := f t y(t), . . . , y(0),f t−1 (y(t − 1), . . . , y(0)), . . . ,f 0 (y(0)) ,
. . , y(0)) = δf t (y(t),...,y(0)) ( · ). Note that π t is a weakly continuous stochastic kernel on A given Y t+1 . Since, for all t ≥ 0, we have
it is straightforward to prove that (π, µ) is a mean-field equilibrium. In the sequel, we use (π, µ) to prove the approximation result. The following theorem is the main result of this section, which states that the policy π (N ) = (π, . . . , π), where π is repeated N times, is an ε-Nash equilibrium for sufficiently large N . Proof of Theorem 5.1 Note that the policy π in the mean-field equilibrium is not necessarily Markovian, which makes the joint process of the state, observation, and mean-field term non-Markov. To prove Theorem 5.1, we will first construct an equivalent game model whose states are the state of the original model plus the current and past observations. In this new model, the mean-field equilibrium policy automatically becomes Markov. Then, we will use the proof technique in our previous paper Saldi et al. [30] to show the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium.
This new game model is specified by
where, for each t ≥ 0,
and A are the Polish state and action spaces at time t, respectively. The stochastic kernel P t : S t × A × P(S t ) → P(S t+1 ) is defined as:
where B t+1 ∈ B(X), D k ∈ B(Y) (k = 0, . . . , t + 1), s(t) = (x(t), y(t), y(t − 1), . . ., y(0)), and ∆ t,1 is the marginal of ∆ t on X. Indeed, P t is the controlled transition probability of next state-observation pair, current observation, and past observations x(t + 1), y(t + 1), y(t), . . ., y(0) given the current state-observation pair and past observations x(t), y(t), y(t − 1), . . ., y(0) in the original mean-field game. For each t ≥ 0, the one-stage cost function C t : S t × A × P(S t ) → [0, ∞) is defined as:
Finally, the initial measure λ 0 is given by λ 0 (ds(0)) := r(dy|x)µ 0 (dx), where s(0) = (x, y). Suppose that Assumptions 2.1 and 5.1 hold. For each t ≥ 0, let d t denote the bounded Lipschitz metric on P(S t ) 2 , and define the following moduli of continuity:
Then, for each t ≥ 0, the following are satisfied: (I) The one-stage cost function C t is bounded and continuous.
(II) The stochastic kernel P t is weakly continuous.
(III) ω P t (r) → 0 and ω C t (r) → 0 as r → 0. It is straightforward to prove that (I) and (II) hold since c is continuous, p is weakly continuous, and r is continuous in total variation norm. For (III), for each t ≥ 0, fix any (s, a) ∈ S t × A and (∆, ∆ ′ ) ∈ P(S t ) × P(S t ), and for any f : S t+1 → R, definef ( · , · ) = f ( · , · , y(t), . . . , y(0)) where s = (x(t), y(t), . . . , y(0)). Then, we have
Since (s, a) ∈ S t × A is arbitrary and
, we have ω P t (r) → 0 as r → 0 by Assumption 5.1-(a). Similarly, we can also prove that ω C t (r) → 0 as r → 0.
Recall the set of policies Π in the original mean-field game. LetΠ be the set of policies in Π which only use the observations; that is, π ∈Π if π t : Y t+1 → P(A) for each t ≥ 0. Note thatΠ is a subset of the set of Markov policies in the new model. For any measure flow ∆ = (∆ t ) t≥0 , where 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS ∆ t ∈ P(S t ), we denote byĴ ∆ (π) the infinite-horizon discounted-cost of the policy π ∈Π in this new model.
Similar to Section 3, we also define the corresponding N agent game as follows. We have the Polish state spaces {S t } t≥0 and action space A. For every t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} and every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, let s N i (t) ∈ S t and a N i (t) ∈ A denote the state and the action of Agent i at time t, and let
denote the empirical distribution of the state configuration at time t. The initial states s N i (0) are independent and identically distributed according to λ 0 , and, for each t ≥ 0, the next-state configuration (s N 1 (t + 1), . . . , s N N (t + 1)) is generated at random according to the probability laws
Recall thatΠ i denotes the set of policies that only use local observations for Agent i in the original game. Note thatΠ i is an admissible class of policies for the new model. Indeed, policies inΠ i are Markov for this new model since they partly use the state information. We letΠ c i denote the set of all policies inΠ i for Agent i that are weakly continuous; that is, π = {π t } ∈Π Proof. The proof of the proposition is given in Appendix B. By Proposition 5.1, in the remainder of this section we consider the new game model in place of the original one. Then, we use the same technique as in our previous paper Saldi et al. [30] to prove the approximation result since the policy in the mean-field equilibrium is Markov for this new model. However, as the state space in this new model is expanding at each time step, there will be some differences between the current proof and the proof in Saldi et al. [30, Section 4] . Therefore, for the sake of completeness, we give the full details of the proof.
Define the measure flow ∆ = (∆ t ) t≥0 as follows: ∆ t = L(x(t), y(t), . . . , y(0)), where L(x(t), y(t), . . . , y(0)) denotes the probability law of (x(t), y(t), . . . , y(0)) in the original mean-field game under the policy π in the mean-field equilibrium. For each t ≥ 0, define the stochastic kernel P π t ( · |s, ∆) on S t+1 given S t × P(S t ) as
Since π t is assumed to be weakly continuous, P π t ( · |s, ∆) is also weakly continuous in (s, ∆). In the sequel, to ease the notation, we will also write P π t ( · |s, ∆) as P 
Proof. The proof of the lemma is given in Appendix C. For each N ≥ 1, let s N i (t) 1≤i≤N denote the state configuration at time t in the N -person game under the policy π (N ) = {π, π, . . . , π}. Define the empirical distribution
Proof. By Saldi et al. [30, Lemma 4.3] , it suffices to prove that
for any f ∈ C b (S t ) and for all t. We prove this by induction on t.
As {s
, the claim is true for t = 0. We suppose that the claim holds for t and consider t + 1. Fix any g ∈ C b (S t+1 ). Then, we have
( 5.1) We first prove that the expectation of the second term in (5.1) converges to 0 as N → ∞. To that end, define F : P(S t ) → R as
It can be proved that F ∈ C b (P(S t )) (see the proof of Saldi et al. [30, Proposition 4.4] ). This implies that the expectation of the second term in (5.1) converges to zero as L(∆ (N ) t ) → ∆ t weakly, by the induction hypothesis. Now, let us write the expectation of the first term in (5.1) as
Then, by Budhiraja and Majumder [7, Lemma A.2], we have
Therefore, the expectation of the first term in (5.1) also converges to zero as N → ∞. Since g is arbitrary, this completes the proof. Proposition 5.2 essentially says that in the infinite-population limit, the empirical distribution of the states under the mean-field policy converges to the deterministic measure flow ∆. Since the transition probabilities P t ( · |s, a, ∆) are continuous in ∆, the evolution of the state of a generic agent in the finite-agent game with sufficiently many agents and the evolution of the state in the mean-field game under policies π (N ) = (π, . . . , π) and π, respectively, should therefore be close. Hence, the distributions of the states in each problem should also be close, from which we obtain the following result. 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS
Proof. For each t ≥ 0, let us define
Since for any permutation σ of {1, . . . , N } we have
the cost function at time t can be written as
Let F : P(S t ) → R be defined as
One can show that F ∈ C b (P(S t )) as π t is weakly continuous. Hence, by Proposition 5.2 we obtain
Note that by Lemma 5.1, the discounted cost in the mean-field game can be written aŝ
Therefore, by (5.2) and the dominated convergence theorem, we obtain
which completes the proof. In order to prove the approximation result, we have to prove that if the policy of some agent deviates from the mean-field equilibrium policy, then the corresponding cost of this agent should be close to the cost in the mean-field limit as in Proposition 5.3, for N sufficiently large. However, note that this agent can choose different policies for each N in place of the mean-field equilibrium policy. Since the transition probabilities and the one-stage cost functions are the same for all agents in the game model, it is sufficient to change the policy of Agent 1 for each N . To that end, let {π (N ) } N ≥1 ⊂Π 
The following result states that, in the infinite-population limit, the law of the empirical distribution of the states at each time t is insensitive to local deviations from the mean-field equilibrium policy.
Proof. The proof can be done by slightly modifying the proof of Proposition 5.2, and therefore will not be included here. See the proof of Saldi et al. [30, Proposition 4.6] .
For each N ≥ 1, let {ŝ N (t)} t≥0 denote the state trajectory of the mean-field game under policỹ π (N ) ; that is,ŝ N (t) evolves as follows:
Recall that the cost function of this mean-field game is given bŷ
where the action configuration at each time t ≥ 0 is generated according to the probability law
Proof. The proof of Proposition 5.5 is given in Appendix D. Using Proposition 5.5, we now prove the following theorem which is a key element in the proof of Theorem 5.1. 
Proof. Fix any t ≥ 0 and define
We first prove that T N,t (s, · ) : s ∈ S t , N ≥ 1 satisfies the hypothesis in Proposition 5.5. For equicontinuity, note that for any s ∈ S t and for any (∆, ∆ ′ ) ∈ P(S t ) 2 , we have
Since ω C t (r) → 0 as r → 0, the family T N,t (s, · ) : s ∈ S t , N ≥ 1 is equicontinuous. Moreover, sup N ≥1 T N,t < ∞. Therefore, by Proposition 5.5, we have
Since t is arbitrary, the above result holds for all t ≥ 0. Then the theorem follows from the dominated convergence theorem. 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS
As a corollary of Propositions 5.1 and 5.3, and Theorem 5.2, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 5.1. We have
Now, we are ready to prove the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 5.1 One can prove that for any policy π (N ) ∈Π (N ) , we have
for each i = 1, . . . , N (see the proof of Saldi et al. [30, Theorem 2.3] ). Hence, it is sufficient to consider weakly continuous policies in Π (N ) to establish the existence of ε-Nash equilibrium in the new model.
We first prove that for sufficiently large N , we havê
for each i = 1, . . . , N . As indicated earlier, since the transition probabilities and the one-stage cost functions are the same for all agents in the new game, it is sufficient to prove (5.4) for Agent 1 only. Given ǫ > 0, for each N ≥ 1, letπ
Then, by Corollary 5.1, we have
Therefore, there exists N (ε) such that for N ≥ N (ε), we have
The result then follows from Proposition 5.1.
Remark 5.1. We note that, using similar ideas, the finite-horizon cost criterion
c(x(t), a(t), µ t ) for some T < ∞, converge continuously to F t and J ν * ,t , respectively. Note that, in the finite-horizon case, for each n and t < T , these functions are given by
Note that the discount factor β is missing in the above equations. For t = T , we have F
Since c is continuous and ν continuously converge to F t and J ν * ,t , respectively, for each t ≤ T . Therefore, Theorems 2.1 and 5.1 hold for the finite-horizon cost criterion under the same assumptions. Furthermore, if we start the mean-field game at time τ > 0 with initial measure µ τ , then the pair {π t } τ ≤t≤T , {µ t } τ ≤t≤T in Theorem 2.1 is still a mean-field equilibrium for the sub-game.
An Example
In this section, we consider a specific additive noise model to illustrate our results. In this model, the state and observation dynamics of a generic agent for the mean-field game are given respectively by x(t + 1) = X f (x(t), a(t), x)µ t (dx) + g(x(t), a(t))w(t) =: F (x(t), a(t), µ t ) + g(x(t), a(t))w(t) and
where x(t) ∈ X, y(t) ∈ Y, a(t) ∈ A, w(t) ∈ W, and v(t) ∈ V. Here, we assume that X = Y = W = V = R, A ⊂ R, and {w(t)} and {v(t)} are sequences of i.i.d. standard normal random variables independent of each other. The one-stage cost function of a generic agent is given by
This model is the infinite-population limit of the N -agent game model with state and observation dynamics
00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS and the one-stage cost function
For this model, Assumption 2.1 holds with w(x) = 1 + x 2 and α = max{1 + f 2 , L} under the following conditions: (i) A is compact, (ii) d is continuous and bounded, (iii) g is continuous, and f is bounded and continuous, (iv) sup a∈A g 2 (x, a) ≤ Lx 2 for some L > 0, (v) h is continuous and bounded. Note that f is defined as
Indeed, we have
where q is the standard normal density and m is the Lebesgue measure. Hence, Assumption 2.1-(e) holds. In order to verify Assumption 2.1-(b), suppose (x n , a n , µ n ) → (x, a, µ) and let g ∈ C b (X). Then, we have
since g and F are continuous, where the continuity of F follows from Serfozo [32, Theorem 3.3] and the fact that f is bounded and continuous. Therefore, the transition probability p( · |x, a, µ) is weakly continuous. Thus, Assumption 2.1-(b) holds. Note that Assumption 2.1-(f) holds if the initial distribution µ 0 has a finite second moment. Assumption 2.1-(a) trivially holds since d is bounded and continuous. Finally, we will verify Assumption 2.1-(c). Suppose (x n , µ n ) → (x, µ). Then, we have r(dy|x n , µ n ) = q y − H(x n , µ n ) m(dy) and r(dy|x, µ) = q y − H(x, µ) m(dy). Since q y − H(x n , µ n ) → q y − H(x, µ) as n → ∞ for all y ∈ Y, by Scheffé's theorem (see, e.g., Billingsley [4, Theorem 16 .12]) we have r( · |x n , µ n ) → r( · |x n , µ n ) as n → ∞ in total variation norm. Indeed, we have
For any compact interval K = [−k, k] ⊂ X, we can upper bound (6.1) as follows:
The last two integrals in the last expression go to zero (uniformly in (x, a, µ, ν)) as k → ∞, since F and g are bounded, and inf (x,a)∈X×A |g(x, a)| > 0. For any ε > 0, let K ε = [−k ε , k ε ] ⊂ X so that the sum of these integrals is less than ε for all (x, a, µ, ν). Let T ε denote the Lipschitz seminorm of q on K ε . Then, we have
where L f := max{ f , K f }. Since ε is arbitrary, we have ω p (r) → 0 as r → 0. Thus, Assumption 5.1-(a) holds. Note that Assumption 5.1-(c) automatically holds as H is only a function of x.
To establish Assumption 5.1-(b), we need to impose the following additional assumption.
(b') For any u ∈ C b (Z) and ν ∈ Ξ, there a exists unique minimizer a z ∈ A of
for each z ∈ Z and for all t ≥ 0. 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS Under assumption (b'), one can prove that the policy ϕ in Proposition 4.1 is deterministic and weakly continuous (see [30, Section 5] ). Note that the mean-field equilibrium policy is given by
Hence, π is also a deterministic policy as i is a deterministic function. Function i can be recursively given by F t : Z × A × Y → Z (t ≥ 0) in (4.1) and the policy ϕ. One can prove that, under the above assumptions, F t is continuous for all t. Since ϕ is also weakly continuous, we can conclude that the mean-field policy π is deterministic and weakly continuous. Hence, Assumption 5.1-(b) holds.
Conclusion
This paper has considered discrete-time partially observed mean-field games subject to infinitehorizon discounted cost, for Polish state, observation, and action spaces. Under mild conditions, the existence of a Nash equilibrium has been established for this game model using the conversion of partially observed Markov decision processes to fully observed Markov decision processes in the belief space and then using the dynamic programming principle. We have also established that the mean-field equilibrium policy, when used by each agent, constitutes a nearly Nash equilibrium for games with sufficiently many agents. One interesting future direction of research to pursue is to study partially observed team problems of the mean-field type. In this case, one possible approach is to establish the global optimality of person-by-person optimal policies under some convexity assumptions and then use the results developed in this paper. Finally, partially observed mean-field games with average-cost and risksensitive optimality criteria are also worth studying. In particular, using the vanishing discount factor approach in MDP theory (i.e., with discount factor β → 1), it might be possible to establish similar results for the average cost case.
weakly converges to µ t as n → ∞. We will mimic the proof technique used in Feinberg et al. [15, Section 5] to prove the result. To this end, we first prove the following lemma.
In particular, if f ≡ 1, then the above result implies that H (n) 
and so, F (l,1) t (z, a, y)(f 2 ) converges in H t ( · |z, a)-probability to F t (z, a, y)(f 2 ) by Feinberg et al. [15, Theorem 5.2] . Therefore, there is a subsequence {F ) for all i = 1, . . . , N . The second part of the proposition can be proved similarly, so we omit the details.
C. Proof of Lemma 5.1
The claim trivially holds for t = 0. Suppose that the claim holds for t and consider t + 1. For t + 1, let G t+1 = A t+1 × B t+1 × . . . B 0 , where A t+1 ∈ B(X) and B k ∈ B(Y) for k = 0, . . . , t + 1. Define also L t := B t × . . . B 0 , and U t+1 := A t+1 × B t+1 . Then, we have S×A P t (G t+1 |s(t), a(t), ∆ t )π t (da(t)|s(t))∆ t (ds(t)) = S×A G t+1 r(dy(t + 1)|x(t + 1))p(dx(t + 1)|x(t), a(t), ∆ t,1 ) t k=0 δ y(k) (dy(k))π t (da(t)|s(t))∆ t (ds(t)) = X×A×L t U t+1 r(dy(t + 1)|x(t + 1))p(dx(t + 1)|x(t), a(t), ∆ t,1 )π t (da(t)|s(t))∆ t (ds(t)) = ∆ t (G t+1 ).
Since, G t+1 is arbitrary, this completes the proof. 
Hence, (7.1) implies (7.2) for any t. Now, we prove that (7.1) is true for all t, which will complete the proof as (7.1) implies (7.2). Set sup N ≥1 g N =: L < ∞ and define l N,t (s, ∆) := For any s ∈ S t and (∆, ∆ ′ ) ∈ P(S t ) 2 , we have |l N,t (s, ∆) − l N,t (s, ∆ ′ )| ≤ L sup (s,a)∈S t ×A P t ( · |s, a, ∆) − P t ( · |s, a, ∆ ′ ) T V ≤ Lω P t (d t (∆, ∆ ′ )).
Since ω P t (r) → 0 as r → 0 by (III), the family {l N,t (s, · ) : s ∈ S t , N ≥ 1} is equicontinuous. We prove (7.1) by induction on t. The claim trivially holds for t = 0 as L(s l N,t (s, ∆)L(ŝ N (t), δ ∆ t )(ds, d∆) .
Since the family {l N,t } N ≥1 is equicontinuous and bounded, and (7.1) implies (7.2) at time t, the last term converges to zero as N → ∞. This completes the proof.
